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Introduction 
The jurisdiction of Indian1 tribal courts is undergoing a substantial 
expansion in the twenty-first century.2  Both Congress3 and the Supreme Court4
have recently reaffirmed the inherent jurisdiction of Indian tribes, and 
encouraged the expansion of tribal powers to redress the failure of state and 
federal law enforcement to keep reservation communities safe.5  This is a 
marked reversal of federal policy, which had previously worked to circumvent 
tribal jurisdiction6 by handing law enforcement responsibility on Indian 
lands to the states.7
 1.  The word “Indian” is a legal term of art and is regularly used in the law and by lawyers 
to describe many of America’s indigenous people.  The term is used to codify the definition of 
‘Indian Country’ at 18 USC § 1151 and is used to determine which tribes share in a government-
to-government relationship through the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes List Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. 103–454, 108 Stat. 4791 (1994).  But for a discussion of how the term ‘Indian’ is more 
problematic in an international context see H.P. GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD, 60 at 
n.1 (Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 2014). 
 2.  See Matthew L. M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 779 (2014) [hereinafter Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction]; Grant 
Christensen, Creating Bright-Line Rules for Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: The Case 
of Trespass to Real Property, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 527 (2011); Bethany Berger, Justice and the 
Outsider: Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); 
Melissa Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges Facing Tribal Governments in Implementing 
the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts, 90 KY. L.J. 123 (2002).  
 3.  Congress expanded tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in the Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013), and expanded 
the criminal penalties tribal courts may impose through the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010).  
 4.  The Supreme Court has expanded tribal court jurisdiction over time.  In Duro v. Reina, 
495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Court ruled that the inherent criminal jurisdiction of Indian tribes was 
limited only to their members.  However, by 2004, the Court reversed, holding that tribes possess 
inherent criminal jurisdiction over all Indian persons whether or not they are members of the tribe.  
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).  The Court also clarified that tribal court convictions, 
obtained after proceedings that meet all required tribal court procedures, can be used as predicate 
offenses for purposes of expanded federal or state criminal jurisdiction.  United States v. Bryant, 
136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).  
 5.  For a pertinent example, Justice Ginsburg provides some excellent insight on the 
problems of domestic violence which have become endemic in Indian Country.  “‘[C]ompared to 
all other groups in the United States,’ Native American women ‘experience the highest rates of 
domestic violence.’”  151 CONG. REC. 9061 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain).  
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, as many as 46% of American Indian 
and Alaska Native women have been victims of physical violence by an intimate partner.  CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL,
NAT’L INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 2010 SUMMARY REPORT (2011).
 6.  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (An activists Supreme Court 
determined that tribes lack the inherent criminal jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indian defendants).  
 7.  For a discussion of the largest federally approved state-expansion of jurisdiction in Indian 
Country, see Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First 
Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697 (2006); Robert Anderson, Negotiating
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In keeping with these trends, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
responded to signals from Congress and the Supreme Court by affirming 
even the extraterritorial reach of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over tribal 
members.8  In Kelsey v. Pope, the Sixth Circuit unanimously recognized the 
ability of tribal courts to determine the extent of their own criminal 
jurisdiction even when the asserted criminal authority extended to member 
conduct outside the reservation.9  The Sixth Circuit’s decision overcame a 
request for a rehearing en banc10 and a failed petition for certiorari at the 
Supreme Court.11  It is now firmly established as the law of the Sixth Circuit 
and is likely to pave the way as other circuit courts confront similar 
jurisdictional questions. 
This article takes the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kelsey v. Pope12 and 
argues that the principle of tribal court extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
should extend beyond the limited facts of the case to encompass inherent 
criminal jurisdiction over all land owned by the tribe regardless of 
reservation status, and over all conduct of tribal members whenever that 
conduct has a reasonable connection to the tribe.  Moreover, the Sixth 
Circuit’s implied limitation that the assertion of criminal jurisdiction must 
be necessary to “protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations”13 should not be retained by future federal courts reviewing the 
limits of a tribe’s inherent criminal powers because such limitations are 
properly applied only to civil causes of action. 
This article explores the implications of Kelsey v. Pope, and its logical 
legal extensions, to justify a broadening of extraterritorial tribal court 
criminal authority.  Part I puts the case in context by chronicling the 
development of criminal jurisdiction in a world of competing sovereigns: the 
tribe, the state, and the United States.  Part II examines the Kelsey opinion in 
detail, reviewing both the general proposition that tribal sovereignty includes 
the inherent authority of tribes to assert their criminal jurisdiction outside of 
their territory, and the Sixth Circuit’s rejection of the defendant’s argument 
that extraterritorial criminal powers have been implicitly divested as 
inconsistent with a tribe’s sovereign status.  Part III argues that the principles 
of tribal court criminal jurisdiction should extend to all land owned or 
controlled by a  tribe, and should not be limited by a nexus to tribal 
Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority over Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 
WASH. L. REV. 915 (2012).  
 8.  Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 9.  Id.
 10.  Id., reh’g denied, No. 14-1537, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3407 (6th Cir., Feb. 8, 2016). 
 11.  Id., cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 183 (2016).  
 12.  809 F.3d at 849. 
 13.  Id. at 861 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).  
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government interests.  Finally, the article ends with a few brief concluding 
remarks on the future implications of the Sixth Circuit’s decision.
I.  Criminal Jurisdiction Basics 
While the question of whether inherent tribal court criminal jurisdiction 
over tribal members exists on tribal lands outside the reservation was an issue 
of first impression among federal circuit courts, the Sixth Circuit’s decision 
in Kelsey v. Pope was based on almost two centuries of Indigenous history14
and Supreme Court jurisprudence.15  The Court in Kelsey placed particular 
emphasis on judicial precedents involving questions of inherent tribal 
powers in other contexts, like sovereign immunity and civil jurisdiction, in 
order to conclude that a tribe’s inherent power may extend beyond the 
boundaries of the reservation..16
The Supreme Court has confronted questions of criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian Country from its founding.  Early cases focused on the power of state 
or federal courts to assert criminal jurisdiction over activity occurring on 
tribal lands.  As early as 1832, Chief Justice John Marshall held that the state 
of Georgia could not enforce its criminal laws upon lands held by the 
Cherokee Nation because states lacked criminal jurisdiction over Indians in 
Indian Country.17  In 1881, the Court clarified the metes of criminal 
 14.  Neyooxet Greymorning, The Anglocentric Supremacy of the Marshall Court, 10 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV. 191, 198–99 (2017) (“Where the force of British rule could not be exerted, Indian 
people were left to govern themselves in accordance to their own laws, as customs dictated.  This 
was classically demonstrated in 1736, when the British colonial government of South Carolina sent 
a commissioner to arrest Gottlieb Priber, a Jesuit Priest who had been living among the Cherokee 
and working for French interests.  The commissioner, and the military personnel who accompanied 
him, were forced to return to South Carolina under Cherokee escort.  As long as Priber remained 
within Cherokee territory all the ‘lawful’ demands of the English were of no consequence.”). 
 15.  In the 1830s, the Supreme Court held that Georgia lacked criminal jurisdiction over 
Indian country, because the tribe had the exclusive power within its borders.  Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. 515, 562 (1832).  In Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), the Court held that the 
United States lacked criminal jurisdiction over Indians committing crimes on tribal lands.  
 16.  See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832) (“The Indian nations had always been 
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as 
the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”); United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 
614, 617 (1876) (“The tribes for whom the act of 1834 was made were those semi-independent 
tribes whom our government has always recognized as exempt from our laws, whether within or 
without the limits of an organized State or Territory, and, in regard to their domestic government, 
left to their own rules and traditions.”); Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 559 (“If the land reserved 
for the exclusive occupancy of Indians lies outside the exterior boundaries of any organized 
Territorial government, it would require an act of Congress to attach it to a judicial district.”). 
 17.  Worcester, 31 U.S. at 562 (Georgia had enacted a law making unlawful to live within the 
limits of the Cherokee Nation without a license.  Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, Vermont 
missionaries, were prosecuted under the law, convicted, and incarcerated.  Their appeal reached the 
Supreme Court which held that states lack jurisdiction for activities that occur on Indian lands.  “It 
is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the superior court for the county of Gwinnett, in 
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jurisdiction by articulating an exception: States have limited criminal 
jurisdiction over criminal activity occurring in Indian Country when both the 
perpetrator and the victim are non-Indian.18  In 1883, the Court unanimously 
held that when Crow Dog, a member of the Brule Sioux Band of Sioux 
Indians, killed fellow tribal member Sin-ta-ge-le-Scka, the United States 
lacked criminal jurisdiction over the offense because there was no treaty nor 
act of Congress conferring authority over criminal conduct occurring 
between tribal members on Indian lands.19  In response, Congress enacted a 
federal law granting the United States power to assert criminal jurisdiction 
over Indians in Indian Country,20 and the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the congressional action just three years later.21
The development of Supreme Court precedent on tribal court 
jurisdiction took slightly longer, in part because tribes did not traditionally 
have ‘courts’ as the common law envisions them.22  Although in 1896 the 
Supreme Court held that tribal courts did not have to operate using criminal 
procedures identical to those used in state courts, in part because tribal courts 
are not subject to the Constitution nor required to give defendants rights 
the state of Georgia, condemning Samuel A. Worcester to hard labour, in the penitentiary of the 
state of Georgia, for four years, was pronounced by that court under colour of a law which is void, 
as being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States, and ought, therefore, 
to be reversed and annulled.”).  
 18.  United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881) (“The State of Colorado, by its 
admission into the Union by Congress, upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects 
whatever, without any such exception as had been made in the treaty with the Ute Indians and in 
the act establishing a territorial government, has acquired criminal jurisdiction over its own citizens 
and other white persons throughout the whole of the territory within its limits, including the Ute 
Reservation, and that reservation is no longer within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States.”).  
19.  Ex Parte Crow Dog, 105 U.S. at 572 (“To give to the clauses in the treaty of 1868 and 
the agreement of 1877 effect, so as to uphold the jurisdiction exercised in this case, would be to 
reverse in this instance the general policy of the government towards the Indians, as declared in 
many statutes and treaties, and recognized in many decisions of this court, from the beginning to 
the present time.  To justify such a departure, in such a case, requires a clear expression of the 
intention of Congress, and that we have not been able to find.”). 
 20.  The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2013).  See also Christopher B. Chaney, The 
Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Decisions During the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth 
Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 173 (2000).  
 21.  United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“The power of the general 
government over [Indians] is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among 
whom they dwell.”).  
 22.  Barbara A. Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB.
L. REV. 577, 585 (2000) (“Tribal courts, as we know them today, are a modern invention often 
bearing a greater superficial resemblance to Anglo-American courts operating outside Indian 
country than to the judicial systems that operated within tribes historically.  Although justice 
systems existed within tribes in pre-colonial times, much of what has been written about such 
systems is anthropological speculation.”). 
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identical to those enumerated in the Bill of Rights,23  it was not until 1978 
that the Supreme Court addressed tribal court criminal jurisdiction directly.  
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court determined that tribal 
courts lacked criminal jurisdiction over all non-Indians.24  The Court 
reasoned that, although Congress had never explicitly limited tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the power was implicitly divested because it 
was inconsistent with the status of tribes as sovereign entities ‘dependent’ 
upon the United States.25  Twelve years later, in Duro v. Reina,26 the Court 
clarified that tribal courts retain criminal jurisdiction only over members of 
their tribe, and not against any non-member Indian, without an express 
authorization from Congress. 
More recently the Supreme Court has expanded the criminal 
jurisdiction of tribal courts and manifested its support for their procedures.  
In United States v. Lara,27 the Court deferred to Congress and essentially 
reversed the decision in Duro––thereby affirming the inherent power of 
tribal courts to assert criminal jurisdiction over all Indians regardless of their 
tribe.28  In United States v. Bryant,29 the Court held that criminal convictions 
in tribal court, even if uncounseled, could be used as predicate offenses in 
the context of federal criminal law.  While the tribal court’s criminal 
procedures did not need to be identical to those afforded under the 
 23.  Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (“[T]he existence of the right in Congress to 
regulate the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee Nation shall be exercised does not 
render such local powers federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of the United 
States.  It follows that as the powers of local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation 
existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment, which, as we 
have said, had for its sole object to control the powers conferred by the Constitution on the national 
government.”).
 24.  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (“Indian tribes do not have 
inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians.”).  
 25.  Id. at 199. (“[T]ribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, is inter alia, inconsistent with 
treaty provisions recognizing the sovereignty of the United States over the territory assigned to the 
Indian nation and the dependence of the Indians on the United States.”).  
 26.  Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695–96 (1990) (“The contacts approach is little more than 
a variation of the argument that any person who enters an Indian community should be deemed to 
have given implied consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction over him.  We have rejected this approach 
for non-Indians.  It is a logical consequence of that  decision that nonmembers, who share relevant 
jurisdictional characteristics of non-Indians, should share the same jurisdictional status.”).  
 27.  United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 28.  Lara, 541 U.S. at 210 (“[T]he Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an 
exercise of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.  We hold that Congress 
exercised that authority in writing this statute.  That being so, the Spirit Lake Tribe’s prosecution 
of Lara did not amount to an exercise of federal power, and the Tribe acted in its capacity of a 
separate sovereign.  Consequently, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the Federal 
Government from proceeding with the present prosecution for a discrete federal offense.”).  
 29.  United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016). 
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Constitution, tribal court proceedings must meet all other federal procedural 
requirements in order to be used as a predicate offense.30
Against this background, the Sixth Circuit recently determined whether 
a tribal court could assert criminal jurisdiction over a member of its tribe 
when the criminal conduct occurred outside the tribe’s reservation lands, but 
on territory nonetheless owned by the tribe.  This case squarely placed the 
role of both tribal membership and tribal land in the construction of tribal 
court criminal jurisdiction before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
II.  The Sixth Circuit and Kelsey v. Pope 
In 2016 the Sixth Circuit answered a question that was essentially a 
matter of first impression in any federal circuit, but built upon decades of 
federal jurisprudence regarding the scope and extent of tribal court criminal 
jurisdiction.  In Kelsey v. Pope the defendant, Norbert Kelsey, was convicted 
in the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Court of misdemeanor 
sexual assault occurring at the Band’s community center.31  At the time of 
the assault Kelsey was an elected member of the Band’s nine-person Tribal 
Council.32  The victim was a tribal employee, although an enrolled member 
of a neighboring tribe.33
While the community center was owned by the Tribe and was located 
across the street from land that was part of the Tribe’s reservation, the 
community center itself was not held in trust by the United States and was 
therefore not “Indian Country.”34  If the community center had been a part 
of the reservation, no jurisdictional question would have been raised because 
tribes have the inherent power to criminally prosecute their own members 
for criminal activity committed on their lands.35  Kelsey challenged the tribal 
 30.  Id. at 1966 (“Because Bryant’s tribal-court convictions occurred in proceedings that 
complied with ICRA and were therefore valid when entered, use of those convictions as predicate 
offenses in a § 117(a) prosecution does not violate the Constitution.”).  
 31.  Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 852 (6th Cir. 2016).  
 32.  Id.
 33.  Id. at 853. 
 34.  Id. (“The Community Center, located just across the street from the reservation, is 
constructed on land purchased by the Band in fee simple in 1997 but is not within ‘Indian country’ 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151.”).  For additional discussion of Indian country see Katherine J. 
Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal 
Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595 (2010); Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in 
State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73 (1999); Kevin K. Washburn, 
American Indians, Crime, and Law: Five Years of Scholarship on Criminal Justice in Indian 
Country, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003 (2008).  
 35.  See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 204 (2004) (“[T]he power to prosecute a tribe’s 
own members—a power that this Court has called ‘inherent.’ In large part it concerns a tribe’s 
authority to control events that occur upon the tribe’s own land.”) (quoting United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978)).  See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) 
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court’s jurisdiction, arguing that the Band’s criminal jurisdiction is co-
extensive with its reservation boundaries, and it therefore lacked jurisdiction 
over any criminal activity that may have occurred at the community center.36
The tribal court held that its jurisdiction extended over Kelsey’s conduct at 
the community center, and the tribe’s appellate court affirmed.37
Kelsey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Michigan, arguing that the Band’s 
inherent criminal jurisdiction did not extend outside of Indian country.38  The 
district court granted Kelsey’s habeas petition; holding that the inherent 
power of Indian tribes to assert criminal jurisdiction outside of Indian 
country, even over their own members, had been implicitly divested by 
virtue of the tribe’s dependent status.39  The tribe appealed the decision to 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
A.  Inherent Criminal Jurisdiction Outside the Reservation 
The Sixth Circuit began its opinion by rejecting the district court’s 
conclusion that the inherent criminal jurisdiction, manifest by tribal 
sovereignty, stops at the reservation’s borders. Speaking for the Sixth Circuit 
Majority, Judge McKeague reasoned that Indian tribes’ sovereignty 
“preexisted the founding; it is neither derived from nor protected by the 
Constitution.”40  The court recognized the uniqueness of federal Indian law; 
Indians retain the inherent powers that they have always possessed by virtue 
of their sovereignty, but those inherent powers are subject to complete 
defeasance by Congress’ plenary power.41
The Sixth Circuit took its guidance from the Supreme Court, which has 
placed a tribe’s power to punish its own members among the “inherent” 
(“Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their 
members and their territory.”). 
 36.  Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 853.  
 37.  Id.
 38.  Id. at 853–54.  
 39.  Id. at 854.  See also Kelsey v. Pope, No. 14-1537, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43037 at *5 
(W.D. Mich., Mar. 31, 2014) (“The Court’s statement that tribes retain sovereignty over ‘both their 
members and their territory,’ does not mean that a tribe’s jurisdiction over its members is without 
bounds . . . The statement suggests that tribal membership and territory are connected, and that 
tribes retain sovereignty where both are present.”) (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323).  
 40.  Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 855 (quoting Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 2015)). 
 41.  Id. (“Congress wields power ‘consistently described as plenary and exclusive to legislate 
[with] respect to Indian tribes.’” (citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 
(2014)).  This idea has formed the basis of federal Indian from the beginning.  See Philip P. Frickey, 
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonization, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal 
Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993).
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powers all tribes possessed since time immemorial.42  However, the Supreme 
Court had never encountered a situation where the tribe was asserting its 
inherent criminal powers over alleged illegal activity occurring outside of 
Indian Country.  While the Tribe argued that its inherent powers extended to 
the activities of its members wherever that activity would substantially affect 
the tribe’s interest in self-government, Kelsey averred that the tribe’s 
inherent power is coterminous with Indian Country and cannot exist outside 
the reservation absent congressional direction.43
The court was ultimately persuaded by the tribe’s argument that a 
tribe’s inherent criminal jurisdiction extends over its members whenever 
their conduct would substantially affect tribal self-government.  It found 
support for this proposition in a line of Supreme Court precedent that 
contradistinguishes the power of tribal courts over “their members and their 
territory.”44  The Sixth Circuit reasoned that not only has the Supreme Court 
treated membership and territory as an alternative instead of complementary 
basis for jurisdiction, but it has also explained that by virtue of their tribal 
membership, tribal members have consented to the authority of the tribe.45
While the Sixth Circuit recognized that Duro and Wheeler emerged from on-
reservation disputes, the court expanded their principles to recognize that the 
 42.  Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 855 (citing United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 204 (2004)).  
 43. The question pertinent to Kelsey’s case, however, is whether this inherent 
authority to prosecute members extends beyond reservation boundaries.  The 
parties advance two competing theories as to how tribal criminal jurisdiction 
operates.  To the Band, the tribes have ‘inherent authority to prosecute tribal 
members for offenses substantially affecting [tribal] self-governance interests,’ 
even when such offenses take place outside of Indian country.  Kelsey rejects 
this membership-based jurisdiction, arguing that sovereign authority (and thus 
criminal jurisdiction) is defined by the twin factors of tribal membership and 
territory—when either factor is absent, the tribe’s inherent authority, in this case 
criminal jurisdiction, is greatly diminished or altogether absent.  Though our 
governing precedent has not specifically addressed this question, the Band’s 
theory of membership-based jurisdiction is more persuasive.  
Id. at 855–56. 
 44.  Id. at 856. (“The two most helpful cases in establishing membership as the driving force 
behind criminal jurisdiction are United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), and Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676 (1990). Wheeler and Duro are grounded in tribal prosecutions for on-reservation 
conduct, but nonetheless recognize that tribes possess ‘attributes of sovereignty over both their 
members and their territory.’”). See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (emphasis added).  
 45.  Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 856 (“Affirming the inherent authority of tribes to try and prosecute 
their members, the Court in Duro recognized that the tribes’ ‘criminal jurisdiction over members 
is accepted by our precedents and justified by the voluntary character of tribal membership and the 
concomitant right of participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on 
consent.’”).  Consent is a complicated concept in Indian Law.  For an excellent discussion and 
critique of the role ‘consent’ has played in everything from criminal jurisdiction to federal-tribal 
relations see Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45 (2012) [hereinafter 
Fletcher, Tribal Consent].  
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inherent power of a tribe extends to criminal jurisdiction over their members’ 
activity that occurs outside of Indian Country.46
B.  Extraterritorial Criminal Powers Survive a Divestment 
Analysis
While the Sixth Circuit recognized that the inherent power of Indian 
tribes includes jurisdiction over the criminal conduct of their members even 
outside the reservation, the court did not end its inquiry there.  After 
Oliphant, the Supreme Court made clear that a tribe’s inherent powers could 
nonetheless be divested.47  Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Oliphant
recognized that divestment could be explicit (Congress could expressly take 
away a tribe’s inherent power) or it could be implicit (the tribe could attempt 
to assert an inherent power inconsistent with a tribe’s status).48
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion quickly dispensed with explicit 
divestiture.49  It recognized that Congress has never expressly taken away a 
tribe’s inherent power to criminally prosecute its own members.50  The 
question of whether the assertion of a tribe’s inherent criminal power outside 
of Indian Country, and by necessity into and over land controlled by the 
states, had been implicitly divested was more contentious because it required 
a return to the first principles of federalism and the relationship between 
tribal government and the United States.51
 46.  Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 859 (“In sum, Indian tribes possess the inherent sovereign authority 
to try and punish members on the basis of tribal membership.  Wheeler and Duro may not answer 
the specific question of whether tribes are permitted to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
over members, but their core principles strongly support the Band’s theory of jurisdiction.”).  
 47.  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that Indian tribe’s 
inherent power to criminally prosecute non-Indians had been implicitly divested, because it was 
inconsistent with Indian tribes’ status as “domestic dependent nations”).  
 48.  Id. at 210–12. 
 49.  Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 859 (“Kelsey has not identified any treaty or statute that explicitly 
divests the Band of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.  Nor has the district court . . .  Because no 
statute or treaty expressly divests the Band of its inherent authority to try and punish its members 
for off-reservation conduct, we turn to the issue of implicit divestiture.”). 
 50.  Id.
 51. Our remaining inquiry, then, is whether the tribes have been implicitly divested 
of their authority to prosecute members for extra-territorial conduct by virtue of 
their domestic dependent status.  We look first to the history and breadth of 
implicit divestiture, considering whether the Band’s purported jurisdiction is 
consistent with the historical underpinnings of the doctrine.  We then consider 
whether statutes extending federal jurisdiction into Indian Country serve as a 
basis for implicitly divesting tribes of their jurisdiction over off-reservation 
offenses.
Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 860 
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Ultimately, the court determined that a tribe’s inherent criminal 
jurisdiction over its members outside of Indian Country was not implicitly 
divested.  In defining the scope of tribal power that could survive the implicit 
divestment analysis, the Sixth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s 
determination of a tribe’s civil regulatory powers over non-Indians in 
Montana v. United States.52  Citing Montana, the court limited the inherent 
criminal power of tribes to those cases implicating tribal self-government or 
internal relations.53  It proceeded to apply that standard and concluded that 
jurisdiction in this case implicated tribal self-government interests because 
Kelsey was a member of the Band’s legislative council, the victim was a 
tribal employee ‘discharging her official duties’ at a meeting of tribal elders, 
and the crime took place at the tribe’s community center which served as the 
hub of Tribal community activity.54
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that the 
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians’ Tribal Court possessed inherent 
criminal jurisdiction over the activities of its own members, even outside 
Indian Country, whenever jurisdiction was necessary to protect tribal self-
government or internal relations.55  The Supreme Court refused to hear 
Kelsey’s appeal, establishing the Sixth Circuit’s opinion as the governing 
law in the circuit and highly persuasive authority in other jurisdictions.56
III.  The Extension of Inherent Criminal Power 
The Sixth Circuit does not hear many Indian law cases.57  Perhaps that 
is why its opinion in Kelsey v. Pope so easily conflated tribal court civil
 52.  Id. at 861 (“Defining the scope of retained inherent sovereignty, Montana held that the 
‘exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive 
without express congressional delegation.’”) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 
(1981)).  For a critical discussion of the relationship between tribal government and the United 
States, see Wenona T. Singel, The First Federalists, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 775 (2014).  
 53.   Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 861.
 54.  Id. at 861–62. 
 55.  Id. at 863. (“Because prosecuting Kelsey’s conduct was ‘necessary to protect tribal self-
government or control internal relations,’ the Band retained authority to assert criminal jurisdiction 
over his off-reservation conduct.”) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).   
 56.  Id., cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 183 (2016). 
 57.  The Sixth Circuit decided no Indian law opinions in 2017, largely due to the lack of Indian 
tribes in most of the circuit.  (There is no reservation land in Ohio, Kentucky, or Tennessee so 
virtually all Indian law cases originate from Michigan).  For a discussion of the comparative 
weights of the Circuit’s Indian law jurisprudence, see Grant Christensen, A View From American 
Courts: The Year in Indian Law 2017, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805 (2018).  Despite the relatively 
small number of Indian law cases from the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court agrees to review a 
fairly large number of Indian law cases arising from Michigan tribes, although some are appeals 
from the D.C Circuit.  See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 
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jurisdictional principles to determine the scope of a tribe’s inherent criminal
jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court has made clear that the scope of an Indian 
tribe’s inherent criminal and civil jurisdiction are different; “[A]lthough 
Congress’ decision to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts 
to offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians within Indian Country 
supported the holding in Oliphant, there is no comparable legislation 
granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between Indians 
and non-Indians.”58  Professor Matthew Fletcher has perhaps gone furthest 
in exploring the different basis for criminal and civil jurisdiction.59  While 
criminal jurisdiction has largely been shaped by consent,60 civil jurisdiction 
has taken on a larger geographical component, giving  tribes inherent control 
over the civil conduct of persons regardless of their Indian status.61  The 
Kelsey opinion conflates the basis for criminal and civil jurisdiction, which 
in turn over limits the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes that the Sixth 
Circuit otherwise recognizes. 
Less defensibly, the Sixth Circuit imputed the reasoning from the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding non-members to determine the 
proper application of its jurisdiction over the conduct of its own members.  
Not only does the Kelsey opinion use the Supreme Court’s discussion of 
tribal civil jurisdiction in Montana to establish limits on tribal court criminal 
jurisdiction, it also limits the inherent power of tribal courts to their 
membership.62  Neither limitation has been approved by Congress, nor 
suggested by the Supreme Court as mandated by a tribe’s sovereign status. 
The ultimate conclusion that Indian tribes retain inherent criminal 
jurisdiction over the conduct of their members when that conduct risks tribal 
self-government and internal relations is supportable by the case law, but 
such a narrow holding is inconsistent with the inherent power of tribes.63
567 U.S. 209 (2012); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014); Patchak v. 
Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).  
 58.  National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 854 (1985). 
 59.  Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 800–01. 
 60.  Id. Consent here is broadly defined.  Professor Fletcher notes that early opinions like 
Oliphant and Duro limited criminal jurisdiction only to members, but later decisions like United
States v. Lara extend criminal jurisdiction to all Indian persons.  
 61.  Id. at 802–03.  
 62.  Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 860 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hile tribes have not been 
implicitly divested of their right to prosecute members, their unique dependent status requires a 
more nuanced analysis in determining whether they may extend tribal prosecutions to members’
off-reservation conduct.”) (emphasis added).  
 63.  United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (Tribes possess “attributes of 
sovereignty over both their members and their territory.”).  See also Christensen, supra note 2 
(discussing the common law understanding of inherent jurisdictional powers and arguing that tribal 
courts ought to have exclusive jurisdiction over conduct occurring on their lands regardless of its 
connection to tribal self-government or internal relations). 
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The principles of Kelsey ought not to be limited to the exceedingly narrow 
set of facts presented to the Sixth Circuit––but instead expanded to recognize 
the true extent of a tribe’s inherent criminal powers.  Tribes retain criminal 
jurisdiction over their members without any inherent geographical 
limitations as long as the assertion of that jurisdiction does not impair 
significant interests of other sovereigns.  Tribes also retain inherent criminal 
jurisdiction over all Indians whenever their activities affect a tribe’s member 
or its territory. 
A.  A Tribe Retains Inherent Criminal Power Over Its Members 
Without Regard for Geographical Limits 
In Kelsey, the Sixth Circuit relied explicitly upon the Supreme Court’s 
Montana decision to impute a limitation unto tribes inherent criminal 
powers.64  However, Montana is the Court’s ‘pathmaking’65 case on tribal 
court civil jurisdiction over non-members.66  The Supreme Court in Montana
expressly contradistinguished the inherent power of tribes to punish tribal 
offenders with the limitation that a tribe’s actions must relate to its 
governance; “[I]n addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian 
tribes retain their inherent power to . . . [the] exercise of tribal power beyond 
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes . . . .”67  While 
the Kelsey opinion clearly implies that a tribe’s inherent criminal power 
extends only when necessary to promote tribal self-governance or internal 
relations,68 the Supreme Court has never placed a similar limit on a tribal 
court’s criminal jurisdiction. 
The Sixth Circuit should not have required the tribe to demonstrate that 
the criminal prosecution of Kelsey in tribal court was necessary to protect 
tribal self-government because the Supreme Court has only placed that 
 64.  Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 862 (“While certain applications of extra-territorial criminal 
jurisdiction might well be incompatible with the tribes’ status as dependent sovereigns—that is, 
where they tangentially impact tribal self-governance or fail to implicate core internal relations . . . 
the instant exercise of criminal jurisdiction does not fall within that category.”) (citation omitted).   
 65.  Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997) (“Montana v. United States, decided 
three years later, is the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers.”). 
 66.  For a discussion of the role Montana plays in questions of civil jurisdiction, see Fletcher, 
A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, supra note 2; Fletcher, Tribal Consent, supra note 
45; Douglas Endreson, Reconciling the Sovereignty of Indian Tribes in Civil Matters with the 
Montana Line of Cases, 55 VILL. L. REV. 863 (2010); Judith Royster, Montana at the Crossroads,
38 CONN. L. REV. 631 (2006). 
 67.  United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
 68.  Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 861 (“[A] free-floating, membership-based jurisdiction over any
criminal conduct could run headlong into Montana’s holding that retained tribal power (i.e. 
criminal jurisdiction) is only that which is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or control 
internal relations.’”) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).  
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limitation on a tribal court’s civil jurisdiction involving non-members.  In 
United States v. Lara, the Court recognized that Congress had intended that 
the mere assertion of criminal jurisdiction by a tribal court over other Indians 
on tribal lands is an exercise of self-government, without requiring the 
criminal charges to relate to tribal government or a tribe’s internal relations.69
Moreover, the Court expressly endorsed the consent theory of tribal court 
criminal jurisdiction over their members: 
The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain 
additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent 
to be tribal members.  Indians like all other citizens share 
allegiance to the overriding sovereign, the United States.  A tribe’s 
additional authority comes from the consent of its members, and 
so in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal 
authority.70   
Even though the Duro Court’s holding that tribes lacked inherent 
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians was overturned by 
Congress71 and subsequently ratified by the Court,72 the theory of criminal 
jurisdiction by consent over tribal members, elucidated by the Supreme 
Court, has never been expressly overturned.73  Even after Lara an
 69.  United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 (2004) (“[I]n permitting a tribe to bring certain 
tribal prosecutions against nonmember Indians, [it] does not purport to delegate the Federal 
Government’s own federal power.  Rather, it enlarges the tribes’ own ‘powers of self-government’ 
to include ‘the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over all Indians,’ including nonmembers.”) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990)).   
 70.  Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).  
 71.  Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1982 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. § 1301(2)(1990) (“‘[P]owers of self-government’ means and includes all governmental 
powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and 
tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of Indian offenses; and means 
the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over all Indians.”) (emphasis added).  
 72. [S]oon after this Court decided Duro, Congress enacted new legislation 
specifically authorizing a tribe to prosecute Indian members of a different tribe.  
That new statute, in permitting a tribe to bring certain tribal prosecutions against 
nonmember Indians, does not purport to delegate the Federal Government’s own 
federal power.  Rather, it enlarges the tribes’ own ‘powers of self-government’ 
to include ‘the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians,’ including nonmembers.   
Lara, 541 U.S. at 197–98 (2004) (quoting § 1301(2)). 
 73. Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion emphasizes the enduring role consent 
plays in tribal court criminal jurisdiction even after Congress enacted the Duro
fix.  “The Constitution is based on a theory of original, and continuing, consent 
of the governed.  Their consent depends on the understanding that the 
Constitution has established the federal structure, which grants the citizen the 
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overwhelming majority of the Court recognizes that at a minimum tribes 
retain criminal jurisdiction over the conduct of their members.74
Accordingly, while the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the Little Band of 
Ottawa Indians had inherent criminal authority over Kelsey’s conduct, the 
opinion was too limited.  The Band’s inherent power extends to Kelsey’s 
conduct wherever his conduct is criminalized by the Band precisely because 
he has consented to tribal jurisdiction by virtue of his membership in the 
Band.75  This inherent authority is limited only where the assertion of 
criminal jurisdiction by the tribe would substantially impede the ability of a 
sister sovereign (another tribe or a state) to maintain its own independence.76
While the scope of inherent tribal powers over tribal members may 
seem unduly broad, the Court has repeatedly recognized that Indians may be 
treated differently because of their status as enrolled members in federally-
recognized Indian tribes.77  Moreover, there is little reason to fear that tribes 
will use this extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction irresponsibly.  Indeed, 
Kelsey is among the first cases to reach the federal appellate courts––
suggesting that tribal courts generally focus their judicial resources in ways 
that do not regularly trigger jurisdictional challenges premised on tribal over-
reach or threaten the competing sovereignty of other states or tribes. 
So after reading Lara what is left of the Duro decision?  The best 
interpretation of Duro asserts that tribal members consent to the inherent 
criminal powers of their tribe.78  Normally the tribe will not attempt to extend 
protection of two governments, the Nation and the State.  Each sovereign must 
respect the proper sphere of the other, for the citizen has rights and duties as to 
both.
Id. at 212. 
 74.  Id. (The Lara opinion was a 7-2 decision with only justices Souter and Scalia dissenting). 
 75.  For an excellent discussion of how the Supreme Court has encouraged the development 
of consent-based jurisdiction, see Fletcher, Tribal Consent, supra note 66, and Allison M. Dussias, 
Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme 
Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993).  
 76.  Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 ( Kennedy, A., concurring) (“Each sovereign must respect the 
proper sphere of the other, for the citizen has rights and duties as to both . . .  There is a historical 
exception for Indian tribes, but only to the limited extent that a member of a tribe consents to be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of his own tribe.”). 
 77.  Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (the Bureau of Indian Affairs can hire and 
promote Indians within the federal service without violating the due process or equal protection 
clauses or triggering strict scrutiny).  The Supreme Court in United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 
641 (1977) found that the Major Crimes Act allows the United States to prosecute certain crimes 
committed by Indian persons.  The Court held that it was not unconstitutional even though a non-
Indian would not have been charged with murder had they committed the exact same offense.  The 
Court concluded that Congress has singled out Indians for different treatment and the Major Crimes 
Act can survive a rational basis review.  
 78.  Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (“The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a 
recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal 
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its laws beyond the limits of its territory, regardless of whether that territory 
is within a reservation.  However, because a tribe’s sovereign status does not 
originate from the Constitution79 but stems instead from its inherent powers 
as a tribal government, the tribe could decide to extend its criminal laws to 
the conduct of its members free from any geographic restraint. 
B.  A Tribe Retains Inherent Criminal Power Over Non-Member 
Indians Whenever Their Conduct Affects Its Members or 
Territory
The consent-based theory of tribal criminal jurisdiction does not apply 
to non-member Indians (i.e., Indians who are not themselves members of the 
tribe).80  However, both Congress and the Court have recognized that the 
inherent power of tribal courts extends to all Indians and not just tribal 
members.81  The Sixth Circuit in Kelsey made no attempt to delineate this 
power—thus leaving unanswered whether the inherent power of tribal courts 
extends over non-member Indians for conduct occurring on tribal lands, but 
not a part of Indian Country.  However, it is not difficult to construct an 
answer from the first principles laid out above.  A tribe’s inherent criminal 
power extends over all non-member Indians whenever that activity touches 
upon the tribe or its members. 
This conclusion makes sense.  Consider a situation where the Indian 
status of the perpetrator and victim were the reverse of those found in Kelsey;
a non-member Indian sexually assaulted a member of the Band at the 
community center.  Since the community center was located on land over 
which the tribe has control, United States v. Lara dictates that the tribe’s 
inherent criminal jurisdiction permits the tribe to prosecute.82  Clearly, the 
members . . .  A tribe’s additional authority comes from the consent of its members, and so in the 
criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.”).  
 79.  United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1962 (2016) (“As separate sovereigns pre-
existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those 
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”) (citing 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)).  
 80.  Obviously non-members have not opted into tribal membership and therefore they are not 
said to have ‘consented’ to the criminal jurisdiction of the tribal court.  For a discussion of the 
origins of consent-based jurisdiction, see Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction,
supra note 2 at 800–01; L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the 
Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 813 (1996) (“As full citizens of the United States, the Court 
declared, nonmember Indians share the same protections as non-Indians.  It then outlined the 
contours of what has become the doctrine of consent-based sovereignty.  ‘The retained sovereignty 
of the tribe is but a recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who 
consent to be tribal members.’”) (quoting Duro, 495 U.S. at 693). 
 81.  See Lara, 541 U.S. at 197–98, 212. 
 82.  Id. at 210. (“[T]he Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of 
their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.”).  
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tribe has a strong interest in the prosecution of this offense; it wants to protect 
its members from sexual assault by other Indians and it wants to ensure that 
its community center is a safe place for anyone to visit or conduct business.  
These interests strongly favor a recognition that a tribe’s inherent criminal 
power also extends extraterritorially when it’s necessary to protect a tribe’s 
lands or its membership. 
It is equally clear that if it was a non-Indian who assaulted a tribal 
member at the community center, the inherent criminal power of the tribe 
would not permit the non-Indian to be prosecuted unless Congress either 
delegated that power to the tribe or recognized that the tribe’s inherent 
powers extended to the type of assault described.83  While this seems like a 
strange result, the combination of Oliphant with Lara dictate the outcome.  
Oliphant established that a tribe’s inherent criminal power does not extend 
over non-Indians absent congressional action,84 while Lara held that the 
inherent criminal power of a tribe extends to all Indians regardless of whether 
they are members.85  To accord this authority; the inherent criminal powers 
of a tribal court may extend over all Indian persons, regardless of 
membership, for criminal activity occurring on tribal lands.  This includes 
lands, like the community center in Kelsey v. Pope, that are located outside 
of Indian Country, but does not automatically extend to non-Indians. 
Congress has recognized the inherent powers of tribal governments “to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians,”86 but such recognition comes 
with some implied limits related to territoriality.  A tribe in California may 
not exercise its criminal powers over the conduct of members of a Michigan 
tribe while on its Michigan reservation simply because the California tribe 
has a tribal court and the members of the Michigan tribe are Indians.  Unlike 
tribal members, non-member Indians did not consent to the jurisdiction of 
the tribe and so they come within its reach only by interacting with its 
citizens or threatening the security of its land.  The Supreme Court has placed 
this limit on the inherent power of tribal courts “Indian tribes are unique 
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members 
 83.  Tribes have had their inherent power to criminally prosecute non-Indians implicitly 
divested, because the assertion of that criminal power is inconsistent with their sovereign status.  
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210–12 (1978).  However United States v. Lara
clearly holds that the courts will defer to Congress when it recognizes that the inherent power of 
tribes is broader than those powers previously articulated by the Court.  Congress has recently done 
so again with the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)—permitting tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over a series of crimes related to domestic violence.  See generally Angela
Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA. L. REV. 1564 (2016).  For a discussion 
about the interaction between VAWA and Indian tribes before its reauthorization, see Tatum, supra
note 2.  
 84.  Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210–12. 
 85.  See Lara, 541 U.S. at 802–03. 
 86.  Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 861 (6th Cir. 2016). 
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and their territory.”87  Extending this language from Mazurie, as 
affirmatively applied by the Court in Lara, establishes a natural limitation 
on the extent of a tribe’s inherent criminal authority over non-members. 
Conclusion
Tribal courts continue to press the limits of a tribe’s inherent criminal 
jurisdiction.  Consistent with this movement, the Sixth Circuit was recently 
the first federal circuit court to be presented with a case about the expansion 
of tribal court criminal jurisdiction outside of Indian Country.  While Kelsey
v. Pope established the proposition that the inherent criminal power of tribes 
can extend beyond the reservation borders, the Sixth Circuit also confused 
the Supreme Court’s criminal and civil jurisprudence, and was overly 
cautious when it placed the Montana limits upon a tribal court’s inherent 
criminal jurisdiction. 
As questions of off-reservation tribal criminal jurisdiction become more 
common, Kelsey v. Pope will serve as a starting point from which other 
courts diverge.  As jurisprudence in this area develops, federal courts should 
conclude that there are no artificial limits placed upon the inherent criminal 
jurisdiction of a tribe over the conduct of its members.  As a condition of 
membership, tribal members generally agree to be bound by the tribe’s 
criminal rules and to be held accountable in tribal court.  Limitations on a 
tribe’s criminal powers should be placed upon tribal courts only when: (1) 
they attempt to prosecute non-Indians for crimes when Congress has not 
recognized the extension of a tribe’s inherent powers; or (2) when they seek 
to prosecute non-member Indians for conduct that occurs outside of tribal 
lands.  Only when non-members have not expressly consented to the 
jurisdiction of the tribal court is it reasonable to require that a tribe justify 
the assertion of its inherent powers by demonstrating that the non-member’s 
conduct has a significant impact on the tribe’s members or territory. 
 87.  Lara, 541 U.S. at 204 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).  
